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ABSTRACT 
We analyze a setting typical of industries right after liberalization, or after structural demand and technology changes. 
An incumbent firm has an exogenous capacity, and a new entrant has to set its capacity level. We find that, in a dy- 
namic context, higher capacity increases the severity of punishment after deviation, thereby favoring the emergence of 
cartels. The cartel in this case could hurt welfare, not only because of the standard deadweight loss motive, but also be- 
cause of the cost inefficiency due to high and idle capacity. We conjecture that a competitive arrangement could be both 
welfare enhancing and profit-maximizing for the incumbent. 
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1. Introduction 
Many industries evolve over time from an initial mo- 
nopolistic setting towards more competitive frameworks, 
with one or more new entrants adding to the incumbent. 
As long as the number of entrants remains small, how- 
ever, an environment favorable to collusion is likely to 
emerge. 
Among the set of regulated industries, electricity ge- 
neration represents a good benchmark for the theoretical 
analysis developed in the present paper. First, in electri- 
city generation, firms engage in a dynamic game, char- 
acterized by frequent interactions, information transpa- 
rency, as well as by high time-sensitivity of demand, so 
that for most of the time a large portion of the installed 
industry capacity remains idle. All the above characteris- 
tics are recognized in the literature as facilitating factors 
for collusion. Second, electricity is an industry typically 
dominated by a large incumbent, who faces the (potential) 
competition by new entrants.1 Turning now towards un- 
regulated industries, the airplane industry may fit the 
framework developed in this paper nicely. The increase 
in demand, coupled with the development of technolo- 
gies reducing the optimal size of planes, may generate 
room for more than one firm in many routes. At the same 
time, the frequency of interactions lets us suppose that, 
once capacity is installed, the firms will engage in a re- 
peated game, where collusion may emerge. 
The future entry prospects may not be reasonably an- 
ticipated at the time of the incumbent’s investment. For 
example, in electricity, the incumbent firms in various 
countries made their investment decisions in a regulated 
environment, while they were often enjoying legal mo- 
nopolies in their home market. The former integrated 
monopolies had neither the incentives nor the mandate to 
calibrate their capacity in view of future entry. In the air- 
plane industry, uncertainty over the technological evolu- 
tion may suggest the monopolists to calibrate their ca- 
pacities on the current demand and cost structures, while 
revising their choices in the future if needed. Following 
this motivation, in this paper we regard the incumbent’s 
decision as exogenous, and we analyze a two stage game. 
In the first (entry) stage, a potential new entrant decides 
whether or not to enter the market. In the (second) pro- 
ductive stage, the firms engage in a repeated game and 
collude on prices whenever it is rational for them to do so. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec- 
tion 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 illustrates 
the model. Section 4 summarizes the main results, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
The model developed in Section 3 has several points of 
contact with the papers dealing with multiple stage 
games, and analyzing how firms’ capacities affect the 
outcome, under a variety of game formats, and different 
hypotheses on both the forms of competition at various 
stages, and the timing of entry. 1See Boffa, Pingali and Vannoni [1] for an analysis of the electricity 
generation sector in Italy. The first of these papers is by Kreps and Scheinkman 
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(KS) [2], who examine a simultaneous capacity game, 
followed by a price competition stage. They find that this 
game structure yields the Cournot outcome, highlighting 
also that a limited capacity has the effect of relaxing 
price competition. Brock and Scheinkman (BS) [3] con- 
sider capacity as exogenous, and analyze a repeated price 
game, where firms collude whenever it is rational for 
them do so. They illustrate how aggregate capacity 
shapes the threat after a deviation, by explicitly analyzing 
the tradeoffs between the two countervailing effects of a 
capacity increase. On the one hand, as long as the indi- 
vidual firms’ initial capacity stock is not sufficient to 
cover the entire market demand, a larger capacity 
(weakly) increases the one-shot deviation profit, by al- 
lowing the firm to increase the output produced right 
after the deviation occurs. This contributes to making 
collusion more difficult to sustain. On the other hand, 
until aggregate capacity is sufficiently low that all of the 
firms are needed to contribute to production to reach the 
competitive outcome (i.e., the capacity of all the firms 
except for the largest one is not sufficient to cover the 
market demand at the competitive price), profits involved 
in the static Bertrand equilibrium are decreasing in ag-
gregate capacity. Therefore, if each firm proportionally 
increases capacity, the individual continuation profit is 
reduced, thereby increasing the collusive potential. The 
intensity of each of the two effects depends on the initial 
capacity stock. When it is low (high), the second (first) 
effect is prevailing, and adding capacity facilitates (hin- 
ders) collusion. Therefore, an increase in aggregate ca-
pacity has a non-monotonic effect on the sustainability of 
the cartel. Davidson and Deneckere (DD) [4] analyze a 
framework similar to BS. However, it substantially dif-
fers in that capacity is endogenously chosen in a non- 
cooperative fashion; a repeated game, analogous to BS, 
follows. DD find that carrying (idle) excess capacity fa- 
vors the emergence of collusive behavior. They also find 
that capacity levels and collusion both increase if the 
discount factor rises or the cost of capacity declines. 
With a low discount factor, or a high capacity cost, it 
becomes too costly to carry enough capacity to support 
the monopoly equilibrium. Benoit and Krishna [5] allow 
for the option of adjusting capacity every period, and 
find a set of equilibria sharing the property that in equi- 
librium firms carry excess capacity. 
The stream of literature on sequential entry has ana- 
lyzed both static and dynamic competition (in prices or 
quantities). The standard results for static competition, in 
both prices and quantities, after sequential entry (see 
Spence [6] and Dixit [7]) indicate that entry may be de- 
terred by installing a sufficiently high capacity, as this 
represents a commitment towards an aggressive behavior 
on the incumbent’s part, if entry had to take place. When 
the post-entry structure is modeled as a dynamic game,  
the reasoning changes dramatically. As Benoit and Kri- 
shna (BK) [8] point out “commitments that make preda- 
tory behavior in the post-entry game credible also in- 
crease the prospects for collusion. This is because in a 
dynamic setting, a greater degree of collusion may be 
supported by the increased severity of available threats. 
The entrant may view the incumbent’s choice as a com- 
mitment to collude”. While in a static setting high capa- 
city provides the incumbent with a commitment towards 
aggressive behavior if entry occurred, in a dynamic set- 
ting this same strategy may be interpreted as a commit- 
ment to collude (as it reduces the continuation profit after 
deviation). Table 1 provides a useful categorization of 
the above mentioned papers. 
In our paper, we consider the incumbent’s capacity as 
exogenous, and we model the entrant’s response in view 
of a post-entry dynamic price game. We examine the role 
of the discount factor in determining the outcome of the 
new entrant’s capacity choice followed by a dynamic 
price game. We find that the entrant’s capacity choices 
are such that the non-cooperative behavior prevails for 
sufficiently high discount factor levels, while the static 
one-shot equilibrium prevails even in the dynamic game 
for a low level of the discount factor. When the discount 
factor is high, the entrant enjoys a more significant bene- 
fit from additional capacity, while the capacity cost re- 
mains constant. As the discount factor increases, excess 
capacity increases as well, thereby creating potential in- 
efficiencies. The entrant expands its capacity beyond the 
level it will use not only for the standard reason of being 
able to sustain the collusive arrangement, but also to in-
crease its production share within the cartel. This is due 
to the adopted sharing rule. 
3. A Model of Entry and Collusion 
We consider an incumbent I who installs monopoly ca- 
pacity. After some (possibly exogenous) regulatory or 
technological changes, entry becomes a feasible option, 
so that I faces the threat of competition by a potential 
new entrant E. E decides whether or not to enter. If it 
enters, it will tacitly collude with the incumbent when it 
is rational for him to do so. The stages of the game are 
the following: 0) I is exogenously assigned a capacity 
level, assumed to be at the monopoly level; 1) E decides 
whether to enter or not, and, if entry occurs, chooses the 
capacity level; 2) an infinitely repeated production game 
is played. 
We aim at investigating how the collusive potential, 
after the incumbent’s monopoly choice, affects the en- 
trant’s decisions and the outcome of the game. We make 
the following assumptions: 1) Firms face a unit linear 
demand: p = 1 – Q; 2) There is a fixed/sunk cost of entry 
F, which will remain implicit in the rest of the model; 3) 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
F. BOFFA, D. VANNONI 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
318 
 
Table 1. Capacity, entry and collusion. 
Paper Timing of entry Capacity Price Main Results 
Kreps & Scheinkman (1983) Simultaneous Endogenous One-shot game  (non-cooperative) Low capacity relaxes price competition 
Brock & Scheinkman (1985) - Exogenous Repeated game (potentially collusive) Collusion is a non-motonic function of capacity
Benoit & Krishna (1987) Simultaneous Endogenous, but  adjustable 
Repeated game 
(potentially collusive) Excess capacity allows collusion 
Davidson & Deneckere 
(1990) Simultaneous 
Endogenous, but not  
adjustable 
Repeated game 
(potentially collusive) Excess capacity favors collusion 
Dixit (1989) Sequential Endogenous One-shot-game (non-cooperative) High capacity deters entry 
Benoit and Krishna (1991) Sequential Endogenous Repeated game (potentially collusive) 
Low capacity deters entry, excess capacity  
favors collusion 
This paper Sequential 
Exogenous for  
incumbent, endogenous
for the equally efficient 
new entrant 
Repeated game 
(potentially collusive) 
The entrant tends to enter, and to install a higher 
capacity, if he can collude 
 
Each unit of installed capacity has a cost of r = 1/2; 4) 
There are zero marginal production costs; 5) The follow- 
ing sharing rule is in place  E E E IS k k k   and 
1I ES   S , where S is the market share; 6) 1E Ik k  .  
Assumptions 3) and 4) prescribe a positive cost of ca-
pacity and symmetric marginal costs. Assumption v) 
represents a quite common sharing rule (see Davidson 
and Deneckere [4]), which is consistent with most em-
pirical observations. Assumption 6) reflects a feature of 
recently privatized and liberalized industries, where a 
large formerly State-owned monopolist faces the pros-
pect of new entrants, which normally start operation on a 
smaller scale. 
3.1. Monopoly Choice by I 
We first derive the investment and price choices for a 
monopolist wishing to maximize profit neglecting the 
threat of potential entry. In such case, 
 1π
1 2
I I I
I
k k k

   . Maximization with respect to Ik  
yields  1 1
4I
k     
As the discount factor increases, the cost of capital re- 
mains constant, while the relative value of future revenue 
streams grows. As a result the optimal capacity invest- 
ments increases with the discount factor. The single pe- 
riod price and discounted profits are respectively equal 
to: 
3 1
4 4
p     and  
2(1 )π
16 1I


   . 
3.2. The New Entrant’s Choice 
In choosing its scale of operation, the new entrant con-
siders four effects of a marginal increase in capacity.  
First, as long as capacity lies above the static monop-
oly output, the static game profit is decreasing, due to the 
retaliatory reaction after a deviation from the collusive 
arrangement takes place. This effect encourages collu-
sion, by making a deviation less appealing. 
Second, there is an increase in the chiseling profit, that 
reduces the cartel stability and (weakly) decreases E’s 
profits. 
Third, if a monopolistic cartel is still prevailing, the 
entrant’s production share in the arrangement, as well as 
E’s profits, are increased. 
Fourth, the increase in capacity trivially increases the 
capacity costs, and directly reduces E’s profits. The in-
terplay among these four effects determines E’s choices. 
In analyzing the entrant’s choice, we are restricting our-
selves to our assumption 6)   1E Ik k 
Following Davidson and Deneckere [4], we split the 
analysis into different sub-cases: 
1) 
1 (1)
2
1 (6)
I E
E I
k k
k k
 
 
  
2) 
1 (2)
2
1 1 (3)
2 2
I E
I E
k k
k k
 
 
 
3)   1 1 2 (2
1 (6)
I E E
E I
k k k
k k
  
 
4)
 
The logic for the need to separate the analysis into 
multiple groups is the following. The dynamic game pro- 
fit, along with the output sustainable in a collusive agree- 
ment, depends on the Bertrand profit, which constitutes 
the continuation profit accruing to a firm that decides to 
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deviate from the arrangement, within a Nash reversion 
setting. The Bertrand profit function is a step function, 
with multiple functional forms for different ranges of 
values for Ik  and Ek . Hence the need to analyze each 
case separately. 
3.2.1. Case 1) 
In this case, the aggregate capacity is below the monop-
oly output in the stage game (which is equal to 1/2). Us-
ing the fact that (1 ) 4Ik    , we rewrite (1) as 
(1 ) 4Ek    and (vi) as (1 ) 4Ek   : both firm’s 
capacities are entirely absorbed by the market, and the 
equilibrium price tops the monopoly price. Clearly, (1) is 
more stringent than 6), and therefore it’s the relevant  
one. Hence, the price equals: 11
4 E
p    k . The ob-  
jective function for E is then: 
11
4
max π
1 2E
E E
E
Ek
δ k k
k=
- δ
           
At the unconstrained optimum, we have  1 1
8E
k    .  
We need to verify that constraint (1) holds:  
 1 11
8 4E
k     , which holds only for 1
3
  . It  
follows that the optimal output and the resulting profit in 
case 1) are respectively: 
1 1if
8 3
1 1if
4 3
Ek
 
 

    
 
and 
2(1 ) 1if
64(1 ) 3π
1if
8 3
E
 
 

     
 
3.2.2. Case 2) 
In this case, the aggregate industry capacity kI + kE ex-
ceeds the monopoly output in the stage game (equal to 
1/2), but only by a limited amount. Using the fact that 
(1 ) 4Ik    , we rewrite (2) as (1 ) 4Ek    and (3) 
as (1 ) 2Ek   . Therefore, the Bertrand equilibrium 
involves no capacity restriction, and every firm entirely 
utilizes its capacity. Since aggregate industry capacity is 
only slightly higher than 1/2, the profit in the static game 
is only modestly lower than the optimal (i.e., monopoly) 
profit. The significance of the deviation profit makes 
collusive agreements very unstable, and ultimately hin- 
ders collusion. Even in this case the outcome is a repeti- 
tion, at each stage, of the static game outcome:  1Ek    8 . By verifying the compatibility with con-
straints (2), (3), and (6), it follows that the optimal output 
and the corresponding profits in case 2) are the follow-
ing: 
 
1 1if
4 3
1 11 if
8 3
1 3if
2 5
Ek
 
 
 

  3
5
    
  
and 
 
 
2
1if
8 3
1 1 3π if
64 1 3 5
3 1 3if
8 5
E
 
 
 

       
 
3.2.3. Case 3) 
Case 3) is the only one where we observe equilibrium 
excess capacity. 
  1 1 22I Ek k   Ek           (4) 
For such a high (relative to cases 1) and 2)) aggregate 
capacity, the Bertrand equilibrium involves a capacity 
restriction, as each firm’s optimal response to the rival’s 
prescribes a limited production. This implies that the 
Bertrand equilibria of the one-shot game involve mixed 
strategies. Aggregate capacity under this circumstance is 
relatively high, so that the threat to resort to a compete- 
tive outcome is sufficiently severe to constitute a deter- 
rent from deviation, and, as a consequence, to allow for a 
monopolistic outcome. Observe that the prevalence of 
the collusive outcome entails the enactment of the shar- 
ing rule.  
Rewriting (4) and replacing for the incumbent’s ca-  
pacity level, we have: 
23 21 (
4E
k     4) . In  
this case, the size of capacity is relevant enough to gen-
erate a relatively low Bertrand profit. The low continua-
tion profit reduces the temptations to deviate, thereby 
increasing the prospects of an effective cartel enforce-
ment. Clearly, however, the chances to support a collu-
sive equilibrium depend on the discount factor, which 
has to be sufficiently high. The standard collusive indi-
vidual rationality constraints, one for E and one for I, are: 
π π π1 1
mon
mon bertrandE E
E
S E         (5a) 
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and  
π π π1 1
mon
mon bertrandI I
I
S E          (5b) 
Aggregating 5(a) and 5(b), we derive condition (6): 
  12 21 4 1
12 1
4
E E E
E
k k k
k



          
    (6) 
We do not solve analytically for Equation (6). How- 
ever, we compute the maximal value of Ek  compatible 
with a variety of given levels of discount factors. In 
choosing the optimal Ek , the entrant solves the follow- 
ing maximization problem: 
1
4 1max for
1 2E
E
I E E
I Ek
k
k k k k k
      2    (7) 
under the constraint (6)2 and under the fact that I E
Equation (7) specifies that the collusive profit is given 
by the difference between the collusive revenue 
k k  
1
4
1
E
I E
k
k k

  

  and the cost 
2
Ek . The collusive revenue is  
composed of the share of the collusive output (1/2) 
computed according to the previously described sharing 
rule multiplied by the collusive price 1/2.  
Given the first order conditions, Equation (7) yields  
 
 
 1 1
1 8 4E
k
 

     
(7) is compatible with I Ek k  only for 22  . 
4. Results 
With the help of Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 1 and 2, we 
summarize the results for the different discount factors.  
For 0 < δ < 1/3 the sum of the incumbent’s capacity 
and of the entrant’s optimal capacity choice yields an 
output below the stage game monopoly quantity. Carry- 
ing enough capacity to sustain a monopolistic outcome in 
the stage game would be too costly for the entrant. 
Therefore case 1) prevails. 
For 1/3 < δ < 1 2 , we jump to case 3), where the 
collusive monopolistic outcome prevails, and an excess 
capacity which increases steadily with δ is prevailing.  
For δ > 1 2 , the constraint 6) is binding, and kE = kI. 
Even in this case, collusion prevails.  
While Table 2 reports the optimal values of kE, kI,, πE, 
πI, for cases 1), 2) and 3), and cases with thick borders 
detect the preferred entrant’s choice for different values 
of δ, Table 3 exemplifies the outcomes for some point 
values of the discount factor. In the same vein, Figure 1 
compares case 1), where the aggregate capacity is below 
1/2, and case 2), which is associated with a higher ag-
gregate capacity. As it is shown, the entrant’s profits in 
case b) bypass profits in case 1) for δ > 1/3. 
Finally, Figure 2 compares the “competitive” case, by 
taking, for each δ, the highest profit value between cases 
1) and 2), versus the collusive one. For large enough 
values of the discount factor, when the capacity cost is  
 
 
Figure 1. Cases 1) and 2): Entrants’ profits for different 
discount factors. 
 
 
2Observe that, on the other hand, if 1
2I E
k k  , 1
2E I
k   k . Notice 
that, for 1 3  , the collusive monopolistic outcome would imply an 
(incompatible) aggregate capacity below 1/2. 
Figure 2. Competition versus collusion (case 3): Entrants’ 
profits for different discount factors. 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
F. BOFFA, D. VANNONI 
Copyright © 2012 SciRes.                                                                                  TEL 
321
 
Table 2. The outcome of the game in the three cases. 
 Monopoly Case 1) Case 2) Case 3) 
 kI πI kE πE πI kE πE πI kE πE πI 
1
3
    1 1
8
    
21
64 1



  
 
 
21
32 1




 
1
4

8
    
1
8 1
 


   
1 3
3 5
    1 1
8
   
21
64 1




 
 
21
32 1




3 1 2
5
   
 
 
 
1
1 8
1
4






 
 
 
2 23 8 1
8 1
 

  

 
 
 
11
2 1 8
1
8






1 2   
 1
4

 
 
 
21
16 1



  
1
4
  
8
    
1
8 1
 


 1
2
 3 1
8
 
 
(3 1)( 1)
16 1
 

 
  1
4

  
2
8 1

   
2
8 1


Note that, for an easier comparison with the figures in the first two columns, in cases 1), 2) and 3) the cost of capacity is included in the computation of the 
incumbent’s profit. 
 
Table 3. The equilibrium outcome for the various discount factors. 
 Ik
  Ek
  π I  πE  P Q 
0   0.25 0.125 0.03125 0.015625 0.625 0.375 
0.3   0.325 0.1625 0.0754 0.0377 0.5125 0.4875 
0.4   0.35 0.1901 0.0950 0.051605 0.5 0.5 
0.7   0.425 0.417 0.20831 0.204 0.5 0.5 
0.9   0.475 0.475 1.0125 1.0125 0.5 0.5 
Aggregate quantity is  3 1
8
Q
   (and 5 3
8
p  ) for case 1), while Q = 1/2 (and p = 1/2) in case 2). 
 
relatively low with respect to the revenue stream, case 3) 
prevails. 
5. Conclusions 
Our model shows that, in a dynamic context, higher ca- 
pacity increases the severity of punishment after a devia- 
tion, thereby favoring the emergence of cartels. The car- 
tel is effective under a high value of the discount factor, 
where carrying idle capacity would be too costly. When 
the discount factor is high, the new entrant increases ca- 
pacity in order to be able to sustain a collusive arrange- 
ment. Our results confirm Davidson and Deneckere’s [4] 
findings, even in the context of a sequential game with 
exogenous capacity by the incumbent. 
The cartel in this case could hurt welfare, because of 
the cost inefficiency due to high and idle capacity. In- 
deed, an interesting result is that both blockaded entry 
(which occurs when sunk costs of entry, F, are suffi- 
ciently high), and entry with small capacity, occur when 
the Antitrust Authority enforces a competitive behavior, 
and in both cases the position of the incumbent is im- 
proved too. As a result of this, we conjecture that a com- 
petitive arrangement could be both welfare enhancing, as 
well as profit-maximizing for the incumbent. Therefore, 
a strict Antitrust enforcement, along with pro-competi- 
tive arrangements in which the incumbent is forced to 
transfer part of its capacity to the new entrant, could be 
welfare-enhancing. 
This paper could be fruitfully extended in two direc- 
tions. First, one might analyze a sequential capacity choice 
game, followed by, rather than price competition, dy- 
namic Cournot competition. It would be interesting to 
check under what conditions the first mover advantage 
would persist in this game. 
A second interesting addition might consist in consi- 
dering alternative initial capacity levels for the incum- 
bent, so as, for example, to be able to deal with cases in 
which regulation imposes higher production than the one 
considered in Section 3.1. Our preliminary intuition is 
that, as I’s capacity gets larger, a collusive behavior is 
more likely to occur. 
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